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TORT LAW-DUTY TO WARN- PSYCHIATRIST'S DUTY TO WARN THIRD
PARTIES OF DANGEROUS PATIENTS-The Superior Court of New Jersey
has held that a psychiatrist, upon a determination that his patient may
be potentially dangerous, has a duty to warn a third party who may be
harmed by the patient.
McIntosh v. Milano, 168 N.J. Super. 466, 403 A.2d 500 (1979).
In July, 1975, Lee Morgenstein murdered Kimberly McIntosh.' At
the time of the murder, Morgenstein had been receiving weekly psy-
chiatric treatment from Dr. Michael Milano for approximately two
years.2 In the course of their therapeutic relationship, Dr. Milano had
learned of Morgenstein's fantasies, his sexual experiences with the
decedent, his jealousies of the decedent's other relationships, and his
possession of a knife.' However, Dr. Milano denied that Morgenstein
had ever expressed feelings of violence toward or an intent to kill the
decedent.' After the murder of her daughter, the decedent's mother in-
stituted a wrongful death action against Dr. Milano, alleging that he
breached his duty to warn the decedent or her family of a potential
danger to them.5 The defendant sought summary judgment on the
basis that he owed no duty to warn the decedent or her parents about
the content of his confidential discussions with Morgenstein.6
1. Kimberly McIntosh had lived with her parents next door to the Morgenstein
family. Prior to the fatal shooting, she had moved away from the family home. Morgen-
stein knew that she was expected to visit her parents, so he waited for her with a pistol
that he kept hidden at home. Morgenstein then induced her to accompany him to a local
park where he shot her in the back. McIntosh v. Milano, 168 N.J. Super. 466, 470-74, 403
A.2d 500, 502-04 (1979).
2. Id. at 470, 403 A.2d at 502. Morgenstein was fifteen when a school psychologist
suggested that he receive psychiatric treatment and gave the names of certain therapists
to Morgenstein's parents. Id. at 472, 403 A.2d at 503.
3. Id. at 472-73, 403 A.2d at 503. During the two years in which Morgenstein was
receiving treatment, he related to the defendant fantasies of fear and heroism along with
fantasies of overpowering others by threatening them with a knife. Morgenstein further
revealed that he once fired a B.B. gun at either decedent's or her boyfriend's car when he
was upset that she had a date with her boyfriend. Moreover, he brought to a therapy ses-
sion a knife that he bought so that he could threaten people who attempted to frighten or
intimidate him. Id. at 473, 403 A.2d at 503.
4. Id. at 473, 403 A.2d at 504.
5. Id. at 476, 403 A.2d at 505. The amended complaint of Peggy McIntosh, ad-
ministratrix Ad Prosequendum of the decedent's estate, consisted of two counts. In the
first count, plaintiff alleged that defendant breached his duty by negligently failing to
warn decedent, her parents, or the police of Morgenstein's violent tendencies, anger, and
intentions. In the second count, plaintiff alleged that defendant breached his duty in fail-
ing to consult or advise Dr. McIntosh, decedent's father and Morgenstein's medical physi-
cian, of Morgenstein's mental condition. Plaintiff's Amended Complaint at 1-8.
6. 168 N.J. Super. at 470, 403 A.2d at 502.
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The New Jersey Superior Court followed a decision of the California
Supreme Court" imposing a duty on therapists to warn third parties
and denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment.' The court
stated that whether a duty exists for a therapist to warn third parties
about a potential danger is a question of fairness necessitating a
weighing of the relationship of the parties, the nature of the risk, and
the public interest in imposing the duty.' Recognizing that therapists
may not be capable of a completely accurate prediction of patient
dangerousness,10 the court noted that the therapist would be held only
to the standard for a therapist in the particular field in the particular
community. Moreover, the court determined that an entire class of pro-
fessionals should not be excused from a duty unless, when called upon
to make a medical judgment, the therapists admitted their medical
uncertainty in both predicting patient dangerousness and determining
the effectiveness or necessity of treatment."
The court discussed the general rule that an individual will not be
held to a duty to control the conduct of a third person in order to pro-
tect another unless a special relation exists between the actor and the
third person or between the actor and the other." The court noted that
section 314 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts acknowledges that,
absent a special relationship, a person's realization that his action is
necessary to protect another does not itself impose a duty to take such
action. However, the court pointed out that section 314 indicates that
it should be read together with other sections. Citing the comment to
7. Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal.
Rptr. 14 (1976) (wrongful death action against university, psychotherapists employed by
the university, and campus police to recover for the murder of plaintiff's daughter by a
psychiatric patient).
8. 168 N.J. Super. at 496, 403 A.2d at 515. The court recognized that Tarasoff was
nonbinding authority in New Jersey. 168 N.J. Super. at 471, 403 A.2d at 502.
9. 168 N.J. Super. at 483, 403 A.2d at 508.
10. Id. The court stated:
Realistically, however, duty does partake of many of the characteristics of an
abstract term as defined in standard dictionaries, and thus may be difficult or im-
possible to define in absolute and precise terms, even when applied to specific facts.
Similarly, the terms "dangerous" or "dangerousness" have abstract qualities, as do
such concepts as reasonableness, beauty, and so forth.
Id. at 481, 403 A.2d at 507-08 (footnote omitted).
11. Id. at 482, 403 A.2d at 508.
12. Id. at 483, 403 A.2d at 508-09. Section 315 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
states:
There is no duty so to control the conduct of a third person as to prevent him from
causing physical harm to another unless
(a) a special relation exists between the actor and the third person which im-
poses a duty upon the actor to control the third person's conduct, or
(b) a special relation exists between the actor and the other which gives to the
other a right to protection.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 (1965).
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section 314, the court recognized that it appears inevitable that such
extreme cases of morally outrageous and indefensible conduct will
arise and cause further inroads upon the older rule."3 The court also
noted that section 314A lists four special relationships which give rise
to a duty." Although doctor-patient relationship is not listed in section
314A, the court stated that, in a caveat to the section, the Institute ex-
pressed no opinion as to whether other relations may impose a similar
duty.'5 The court pointed out that the imposition of legal duties upon
physicians is not new.'"
Citing the duty imposed upon physicians to warn third persons
about possible exposure to contagious diseases 7 and certain other con-
ditions,' the court further noted New Jersey statutes imposing duties
to disclose on persons including physicians.'9 Although it recognized
that a relative certainty is present in diagnosis of physical illnesses as
opposed to a psychiatric prediction of dangerousness, the court main-
tained that psychiatrists diagnose and treat without any clear indica-
tion of an inability to predict."
Having set forth the existing law imposing various duties upon
13. 168 N.J. Super. at 484, 403 A.2d at 509.
14. Id. The four special relationships that give rise to a duty are: (1) a common car-
rier to its passengers; (2) an innkeeper to his guests; (3) a possessor of land to members of
the public to whom he holds open his land; and (4) one who takes custody of another under
circumstances which deprive the other of his normal opportunities for protection, to this
other individual under custody. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A (1965).
15. 168 N.J. Super. at 484, 403 A.2d at 509.
16. Id.
17. Id. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:4-15 (West 1964) provides in relevant part:
Every physician shall, within 12 hours after his diagnosis that a person is ill or
infected with a communicable disease or other disease required by any law of this
State, the State Sanitary Code, or ordinance, to be reported, report such diagnosis
and such related information as may be required by the State Department of
Health....
The physician's duty extends to those situations where he should have known of the infec-
tious disease. See Hofmann v. Blackmon, 241 So. 2d 752 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970) (if physi-
cian negligently failed to diagnose tuberculosis in father and child contracted disease from
father, physician would have breached duty owed to child and his estate would be liable
for child's injuries); Fosgate v. Corona, 66 N.J. 268, 330 A.2d 355 (1974) (doctor was liable
for failing to diagnose tuberculosis in principal victim, which resulted in her hospitaliza-
tion and infection of her daughter-in-law and grandchildren).
18. 168 N.J. Super. at 485 n.13, 403 A.2d at 509 n.13. The court recognized that a
physician has a duty to report gunshot wounds to the chief of police and county prose-
cutor and to report epilepsy to the Division of Motor Vehicles. Id.
19. Id. at 485-86, 403 A.2d at 510. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:97-2 (West 1969) (repealed.
1978) stated:
Any person having knowledge of the actual commission within the jurisdiction
of this state of arson, manslaughter, murder, or of any high misdemeanor, who con-
ceals and does not, as soon as may be, disclose and make known the same to a
judge, magistrate, prosecutor or police authority, is guilty of a misdemeanor.
20. 168 N.J. Super. at 485, 403 A.2d at 510.
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physicians, the court revealed the policy considerations underlying its
decision. It found the strongest public policy consideration to be the
need to provide a remedy for a wrong.2 The court noted that it should
not dismiss a complaint merely because the issue is too complex or
may provide a vehicle for a frivolous claim, for the policy of allowing
liberal access of litigants to the courts for redress cannot totally pre-
vent this. However, the court noted that it is for the plaintiff to
establish the appropriate standard with regard to psychiatric diag-
nosis. There may be problems of proof and the defendant has an oppor-
tunity to present and refute evidence as to the appropriate standard of
care.' The court suggested that the remedy lay in improvements in
the competence of the court system, not elimination of causes of
action."
Summarizing its holdings, the court stated that a psychiatrist may
have a duty to take whatever steps are reasonably necessary to pro-
tect an intended or potential victim of his patient when he determines,
or should determine, in the appropriate factual setting and in accord-
ance with the standards of his profession established at trial, that the
patient presents or may present a probability of danger to that person.
The relationships which give rise to this duty may be that between the
psychiatrist and his patient or the obligation a practitioner may have
to protect the welfare of the community.4
The court then addressed the defendant's argument that because of
a need for confidentiality in therapy, an imposition of a duty to warn
would result in socially undesirable consequences to patients.' It em-
phasized that although a New Jersey statute2 ' and the American Medi-
cal Association's Principles of Medical Ethics' recognize a physician-
patient confidentiality privilege, the privilege is not absolute.' A pa-
21. Id. at 487, 403 A.2d at 510. See Lambert v. Brewster, 97 W. Va. 124, 138, 125 S.E.
244, 249 (1924).
22. 168 N.J. Super. at 487-89, 403 A.2d at 510-11.
23. Id. at 487, 403 A.2d at 510.
24. Id.at 489, 403 A.2d at 511-12.
25. Id. at 490, 403 A.2d at 512.
26. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 84A-22.2 (West 1976) provides in relevant part:
Except as otherwise provided in this act, a person, whether or not a party, has
a privilege in a civil action or in a prosecution for a crime or violation of the
disorderly persons law or for an act of juvenile delinquency to refuse to disclose,
and to prevent a witness from disclosing, a communication if he claims the privilege
and the judge finds [certain factors to be present] ....
27. AMA, PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS § 9 (1957), reprinted in AMA, JUDICIAL
COUNCIL OPINIONS AND REPORTS 57 (1966) states:
A physician may not reveal the confidences entrusted to him in the course of
medical attendance, or the deficiences he may observe in the character of patients,
unless he is required to do so by law or unless it becomes necessary in order to
protect the welfare of the individual or of the community.
28. 168 N.J. Super. at 490, 403 A.2d at 512.
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tient's right to confidentiality is limited by supervening societal in-
terests.' Such a limitation is recognized by the medical profession
itself."
The court rejected as inconsistent the defendant's argument that
the imposition of a duty would deter therapists from treating poten-
tially violent patients in light of possible malpractice claims by third
parties. In the court's view, because the defendant argued that psychi-
atrists could not accurately predict dangerousness, it was inconsistent
to argue that the imposition of a duty to warn of dangerousness would
force them to refuse treatment of dangerous patients. If a therapist
were unable to predict dangerousness, the court reasoned, it would be
impossible for him to weed out potentially dangerous patients." The
court noted that a psychiatric prediction of dangerousness is com-
parable to the judgments that doctors and professionals must regularly
make under accepted rules of responsibility.32 It further stated that in
light of past judicial reliance on the ability of psychiatrists to predict
dangerousness, an assertion now of an inability to predict would raise
serious questions about the present commitment procedures. 33
The court noted that whether or not a duty exists is a question of
law. The court cannot determine legal relationships based only upon
ipse dixit and assumptions that a certain course of action will follow
without regard to medical or professional responsibility and ethical
considerations, as well as appropriate legal consideration.3
The argument that the imposition of this duty would result in in-
creased patient commitment 35 was also rejected by the court." The
29. Id. See Hague v. Williams, 37 N.J. 328, 181 A.2d 345 (1962).
30. 168 N.J. Super. at 491, 403 A.2d at 512. See AMA, PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS
§§ 1, 3, 9 and preamble (1957), reprinted in AMA, JUDICIAL COUNCIL OPINIONS AND
REPORTS (1966).
31. 168 N.J. Super. at 493, 403 A.2d at 514.
32. Id. at 494, 403 A.2d at 514 (quoting Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 17
Cal. 3d at 438, 551 P.2d at 345, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 25).
33. 168 N.J. Super. at 494-95, 403 A.2d at 514. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418
(1979) (due process demands a "clear and convincing" standard of proof of mental illness in
civil commitment proceedings); O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975) (an involuntary
commitment in which a person is deprived of liberty must be based on a standard of
dangerousness to self or others).
34. 168 N.J. Super. at 495, 403 A.2d at 514.
35. See Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 452, 551 P.2d 334,
354, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 34 (1976) (Clark, J., dissenting); Diamond, The Psychiatric Predic-
tion of Dangerousness, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 439 (1974) [hereinafter referred to as
Psychiatric Prediction of Dangerousness]; Shah, Dangerousness-A Paradigm for Explor-
ing Some Issues in Law and Psychology, 33 AM. PSYCH. 224 (1978) [hereinafter referred to
as A Paradigm for Exploring Some Issues]; Stone, The Tarasoff Decisions: Suing
Psychotherapists to Safeguard Society, 90 HARV. L. REV. 358 (1976) [hereinafter referred
to as Suing Psychotherapists].
36. 168 N.J. Super. at 496, 403 A.2d at 515 (1979).
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court again noted the inconsistency of this argument with the defend-
ant's earlier argument that psychiatrists are not able to accurately
predict dangerousness. 7 Moreover, the court found a lack of reliable
statistical support for such an argument."
With its decision in McIntosh, New Jersey became only the second
jurisdiction to impose upon a psychiatrist the duty to warn a third par-
ty of his patient's potential dangerousness. 9 This duty had also been
imposed in 1976 by the California Supreme Court in Tarasoff v.
Regents of the University of California." Although the McIntosh court
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Nebraska has become the third jurisdiction where this duty is imposed. In Lipari
v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., No. 77-0-458 (D. Neb. July 17, 1980), a patient who was released
by the Veterans Administration after receiving psychiatric care purchased a shotgun at
Sears and killed a third party. The third party's survivor sued Sears for selling a gun to
one whom it knew or should have known had been adjudged mentally defective or had
been committed to a mental institution. Sears, in turn, filed a third-party complaint
against the United States alleging that the United States may be liable to Sears under
the doctrines of contribution and indemnity.
Two other recent cases illustrate the differences between circumstances that warrant
imposition of the duty to warn and those that do not. In Thompson v. County of Alameda,
614 P.2d 728, 167 Cal. Rptr. 70 (1980), the parents of a five-year-old boy sued the county
for wrongful death, alleging that the county had acted recklessly in releasing from
custody a juvenile delinquent who was known to have dangerous and violent propensities,
and failing to give adequate warning. The court distinguished Tarasoff in two ways. While
in Tarasoff a special relationship existed between the defendant therapists and the pa-
tient, which might support imposition of affirmative duties for the benefit of third per-
sons, the defendant county in Thompson bore no special and continuous relationship with
the plaintiffs. Moreover, unlike Tarasoff, in Thompson the decedent was not a forseeable
or readily identifiable target.
In Shaw v. Glickman, 45 Md. App. 718, 415 A.2d 625 (1980), a husband discovered his
wife in bed with the plaintiff and shot the plaintiff. The plaintiff brought an action against
the "psychiatric team" that had been providing psychiatric care to the husband, the wife,
and the plaintiff. The plaintiff alleged that the team had been negligent in failing to warn
the plaintiff of the husband's unstable and violent condition and the danger presented to
the plaintiff. The court found the Tarasoff rationale to be inapposite in that the intent to
kill or injure had not been disclosed to the defendants. The court further held that had
the husband revealed a plan to shoot the plaintiff, any disclosure by a member of the
psychiatric team would have been a breach of confidence.
40. Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal.
Rptr. 14 (1976). See note 7 and accompanying text supra. Commentaries written in
response to Tarasoff are in agreement that the decision does not adequately balance the
factors that must be considered in deciding whether to impose a duty. Griffith & Griffith,
Duty to Third Parties, Dangerousness, and the Right to Refuse Treatment: Problematic
Concepts for Psychiatrist and Lawyer, 14 CAL. W.L. REv. 241 (1978) [hereinafter referred
to as Duty to Third Parties]; Comment, Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of Califor-
nia-Risk Allocation in Mental Health Care: Whether to Treat the Patient or his Victim,
1975 UTAH L. REV. 553; Note, Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California: The Du-
ty to Warn:" Common Law & Statutory Problems for California Psychotherapists, 14 CAL.
W.L. REv. 153 (1978) [hereinafter referred to as Common Law & Statutory Problems];
Vol. 19:181
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recognized that Tarasoff was not binding authority," the similarity of
the two opinions and the court's extensive reference to Tarasoff in-
dicate the strong influence of Tarasoff on the McIntosh court. In both
cases, to impose on psychiatrists a duty to warn, the courts relied upon
the Restatement (Second) of Torts 2 and case law that imposed upon
the physician a duty to warn of possible exposure to contagious
diseases. 3
A critical analysis of McIntosh reveals that the court's reliance upon
sections 314 and 315 of the Restatement is misplaced. Section 314 of
the Restatement sets forth the general rule that even if a person
realizes or should realize that action on his part is necessary for
another's aid or protection, he is under no duty to take such action."
Section 314A lists special relationships which constitute exceptions to
the general rule." For example, a common carrier is under a duty to
its passengers to take reasonable action to protect them against
unreasonable risk of physical harm, to give them first aid after it
knows or has reason to know they are ill, and to care for them until
they can be cared for by others; an innkeeper is under a similar duty
to his guests; a possessor of land is under a similar duty to members of
the public whom he invites onto his land; and one who takes custody of
another under circumstances so as to deprive the other of his normal
opportunities for protection is under a similar duty to the other." Sec-
tion 315 states that there is no duty to control the conduct of a third
person as to prevent him from causing physical harm to another unless
a special relation exists between the actor and the third person which
imposes a duty upon the actor to control the third person's conduct, or
a special relation exists between the actor and another which gives to
the other a right to protection. ' Sections 316 through 320 list the rela-
tions between the actor and a third person which require the actor to
Note, Imposing a Duty to Warn on Psychiatrists-A Judicial Threat to the Psychiatric
Profession, 48 U. COLO. L. REV. 283 (1977) [hereinafter referred to as A Judicial Threat];
Note, Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California: The Psychotherapist's Peril, 37
U. PITT. L. REV. 155 (1975) [hereinafter referred to as The Psychotherapist's Peril]; Suing
Psychotherapists, note 35 supra.
41. 168 N.J. Super. at 471, 403 A.2d at 502.
42. The Tarasoff court relied upon §§ 314 and 315 of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts. 17 Cal. 3d at 435-36, 551 P.2d at 343, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 23 (1976). These same sec-
tions of the Restatement (Second of Torts were also relied upon by the McIntosh court.
168 N.J. Super. at 483-84, 403 A.2d at 508-09. See notes 12 & 14 and accompanying text
supra.
43. The Tarasoff court cited Hofmann v. Blackmon, 241 So. 2d 752 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1970). 17 Cal. 3d at 437, 551 P.2d at 344, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 24. The McIntosh court also
cited Hofmann. 168 N.J. Super. at 485, 403 A.2d at 509.
44. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 (1965).
45. Id. § 314A.
46. Id.
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control the third person's conduct: the duty of a parent to control the con-
duct of his child;48 the duty of a master to control the conduct of his ser-
vant;49 the duty of a possessor of land or chattels to control the conduct of a
licensee;"0 the duty of those in charge of a person having dangerous pro-
pensities to control the conduct of that individual; and the duty of a per-
son having custody of another to control the conduct of third persons.52
Reliance upon section 315 to impose upon a psychiatrist a duty to
warn is misplaced because that section addresses the existence of a duty
to control conduct of a third party which is different from a duty to
warn the potential victim. Additionally, inherent in each of the special
relationships enumerated in sections 316 through 320 as imposing a duty
to control is an element of controlling, taking charge, or having
custodyO-all absent from the psychiatrist-outpatient relationship. A
psychiatrist who works with his patient for one hour each week cannot
control what his patient does during the remainder of the week' and,
therefore, should have no duty to warn.
To the extent that section 314 deals with a duty to protect rather
than a duty to control, it is applicable to the McIntosh case. However,
to determine whether a duty does exist, one must look to section 314A
which lists special relationships from which a duty will arise. It is here
that the court's reliance is inappropriate. Section 314A lists relation-
ships between the actor and the person to be protected which impose a
duty upon the actor to protect the other.5 However, the McIntosh
court found a duty to warn based upon a special relationship between
the psychiatrist and his patient.58 Section 314A is not authority for
establishing such a source of duty. To apply section 314A, a relation-
ship between the psychiatrist and potential victim must be found.
48. Id. § 316.
49. Id. § 317.
50. Id. § 318.
51. Id. § 319.
52. Id. § 320.
53. The five relationships enumerated in these sections include:
(1) the duty of a parent to control the conduct of his child; (2) the duty of a master
to control the conduct of his servant; (3) the duty of a possessor of land or chattels
to control the conduct of a licensee; (4) the duty of those in charge of persons hav-
ing dangerous propensities to control the conduct of those individuals; and (5) the
duty of a person having custody of another to control the conduct of third persons.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 316-320 (1965).
54. See Duty to Third Parties, note 40 supra. Suing Psychotherapists, supra note 35,
at 366.
55. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315, Comment c (1965).
56. 168 N.J. Super. at 489, 403 A.2d at 511-12.
57. The argument could be made that the psychiatrist has a duty to protect his pa-
tient from committing offenses with unpleasant consequences such as imprisonment. The
argument might be valid if the patient were the plaintiff, but in McIntosh, it is the
parents of the potential victim, not the patient, who are seeking relief.
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The court found this relationship in the obligation that a practitioner
may have to protect the welfare of the community.' However, to im-
pose upon the psychiatrist a duty to warn because of the general rela-
tionship he has with the community by virtue of his status is tenuous.
In support of this relationship, the McIntosh court analogized the rela-
tionship between the psychiatrist and the community to the obligation
of a physician to warn third persons of infectious or contagious
diseases.59 This analogy does not work.
In relying on case law which imposed a duty on physicians to warn
third persons of contagious diseases,0 the court implicitly presumes
that mental illnesses and physical diseases are analogous. The predic-
tion of dangerousness is quite different from diagnosing a known
physical disease.' In order to analogize a physician's warning of expo-
sure to contagious diseases to a psychiatrist's warning of his patient's
dangerousness, the court asserts a critical underlying premise that
psychiatrists are as capable of predicting dangerousness 2 as physicians
are capable of diagnosing diseases. Whether psychiatrists are capable
of accurate prediction has been questioned.' Therefore, the court's im-
plicit assertions are important, for if there is a valid distinction be-
tween mental and physical illnesses, the court's reliance on the line of
cases dealing with contagious diseases is faulty.
Although the court's use of this line of cases to support an imposi-
tion of a duty may be misplaced, its application of the traditional
negligence standard of care to define the imposed duty is not. By
holding that the psychiatrist will be held only to the standard of a
therapist in that particular community," the court provides a
safeguard for the psychiatrist. If he is indeed unable to accurately
58. 168 N.J. Super. at 489-90, 403 A.2d at 512.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 484-85, 403 A.2d at 509 (citing Hofmann v. Blackmon, 241 So. 2d 752 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1970)). See Earle v. Kuklo, 26 N.J. Super. 471, 98 A.2d 107 (1953).
61. The court recognized the distinction between the two illnesses: "There is, to be
sure, a relative certainty and uniformity present in a diagnosis of most physical illnesses,
conditions and injuries as opposed to a psychiatric prediction of dangerousness based on
symptoms and historical performance." 168 N.J. Super. at 485, 403 A.2d at 509-10.
62. 168 N.J. Super. at 494, 403 A.2d at 514. The court stated: "Perhaps the Tarasoff
II decision does assume or accept that the psychiatrist has some ability (or at least has
some special training) to detect and predict dangerousness." Id.
63. See Cocozza & Steadman, The Failure of Psychiatric Predictions of Dangerous-
ness: Clear and Convincing Evidence, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 1084 (1976); Fleming & Max-
imov, The Patient or His Victim: The Therapist's Dilemma, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 1025 (1974);
Common Law & Statutory Problems, note 40 supra; A Judicial Threat, note 40 supra;
Psychiatric Prediction of Dangerousness, note 35 supra; A Paradigm for Exploring Some
Issues, note 35 supra.
64. 168 N.J. Super. at 482, 403 A.2d at 508.
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predict dangerousness in a given situation, and this is the standard for
a psychiatrist in the community, he will not be liable. This does not,
however, free the psychiatrist from a burdensome defense. If the com-
munity standard confirms an inability to predict, the result will be that
no duty will be imposed on the psychiatrist, yet he will have perfunc-
torily proceeded to court.
Although problems with imposition of a duty to warn exist, the
court must decide whether or not this duty to warn should exist as a
matter of law. It is not for the court to decide when a psychiatrist is
capable of accurately predicting dangerousness. A decision by the
court not to impose the duty because of an inability to accurately
predict would have implied that psychiatrists can never predict
dangerousness accurately. Such a position would preclude plaintiffs
from ever having the opportunity to prove that a psychiatrist could
have predicted dangerousness. The court's decision imposes the duty
as a matter of law and leaves for the jury the issue of ability to ac-
curately predict.
The prudence of this judicial expansion of a duty to warn is
debatable. 5 The resolution requires a balancing of competing harms. If
a duty is not imposed, potential plaintiffs will be precluded from seek-
ing a remedy, but if a duty is imposed, psychiatrists will be burdened
with defending such suits. A critical question underlying this balance
is whether, and under what circumstances, a psychiatrist can predict
dangerousness. Thus, the courts in determining whether a duty exists,
are faced with an initial factual question. By imposing the duty to
warn, the McIntosh court has decided the issue as a matter of law and
has left the factual question for the jury. Although the result may be
supportable on this ground, the court's reliance on the Restatement
(Second) of Torts and case law imposing upon physicians a duty to
warn of contagious diseases is questionable.
Susan Ferraro Smith
65. A California court has narrowly interpreted the original mandate of Tarasoff v.
Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976). In
Bellah v. Greenson, 73 Cal. App. 3d 893, 141 Cal. Rptr. 92 (1977), the parents of a
daughter who committed suicide filed suit against the psychiatrist who had treated the
decedent, alleging that the defendant failed to warn others of decedent's mental state.
The California Court of Appeals held that there was no duty to warn where the risk was
of self-inflicted harm, even though there was a duty to warn where the risk was of a
violent assault upon a third party. Thus, in refusing to expand the duty to warn, a lower
California court has limited the application of its supreme court's mandate set forth in
Tarasoff.
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